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Abstract 
We examine a capacitated system exposed to random stepwise capacity disruptions with 
exponentially distributed interarrival times and uniformly distributed magnitudes. We explore two 
countermeasure policies for a risk-neutral decision maker who seeks to maximize the long-run average 
reward. A one-phase policy considers implementation of countermeasures throughout the entirety of a 
disruption cycle. The results of this analysis form a basis for a two-phase model which implements 
countermeasures during only a fraction of a disruption cycle. We present an extensive numerical 
analysis as well as a sensitivity study on the fluctuations of some system parameter values. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Lean manufacturing philosophy and 
associated business practices have been widely 
embraced and deployed by global enterprises. 
Some estimates assert that the shift to JIT 
scheduling in the US automotive industry has 
saved companies more than $1 billion a year in 
inventory costs, alone. While lean 
manufacturing has substantially boosted 
operational efficiency, it has also left enterprises 
operating in an increasingly risk-encumbered 
environment. Capacity disruptions triggered by 
forces of nature, property- and process-related 
hazards, and man-made interventions have 
proven to be the most profound influence on 
enterprise risk. As evidenced in 1995, an 
earthquake hit the port town of Kobe, Japan, 
razed to the ground 100,000 buildings and shut 
down Japan's largest port for over two years. In 
1999, an earthquake in Taiwan displaced power 
lines to the semiconductor fabrication facilities 
responsible for more than 50 percent of the 
worldwide supplies of certain computer 
components, and shaved 5 percent off earnings 
for major hardware manufacturers including 
Dell, Apple, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, and 
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Compaq (Wilcox 1999). In September 2002, 
longshoremen on the US West Coast were 
locked out in a labor strike for 11 days, forcing 
the shutdown of 29 ports. With more than $300 
billion of dollars in goods shipped annually 
through these ports, the dispute caused between 
$11 and $22 billion in lost sales, spoiled 
perishables and underutilized capacity (Isidore 
2002). In December 2002, a political strike in 
Venezuela made transnational businesses 
including GM, BP, Ford, Goodyear and Procter 
& Gamble halt their manufacturing for the 
duration of the conflict (Wilson 2003). The 
recent 2003 outbreak of SARS in China and 
Singapore forced Motorola to close several 
plants (Berniker 2003). Man-made disasters are 
on the rise, from terrorist attacks to computer 
viruses (Lemos 2003). As a result of the above 
events, according to a recent survey by A.M. 
Best Company, Inc. of 600 executives, 69 
percent of chief financial officers, treasurers and 
risk managers at Global 1,000 companies in 
North America and Europe view 
property-related hazards-such as fires and 
explosions--and supply chain disruptions as the 
leading threats to top revenue sources (A.M. 
Best Company 2006). 
Historically, enterprises have lacked 
appropriate decision support methodologies and 
computational tools suitable for addressing risk 
incurred through capacity disruptions. In 
academia, traditional research efforts on 
minimizing the cost of supply chain operations 
and the focus on leveraging economies of scale 
often yield results that overconcentrate resources. 
Such optimal solutions can be very sensitive to 
parameter fluctuations, caused by supply chain 
disruptions. The inability to recognize the 
hidden costs of such overconcentration 
heightens the risk of increased costs and 
capacity imbalance. Much of the recent literature 
focuses on minimizing costs of supply chain 
operations (see, for example, Barness-Shuster et 
al. (2002), Cheung & Lee (2002), Milner & 
Kouvelis (2002), Corbett & DeCroix (2001), 
Lee et al. (1997)), whereas only a small fraction 
of the efforts have been dedicated to modeling 
the impact of various disruptions, such as those 
affecting demand patterns, supplier and 
production lead times, prices, imperfect process 
quality, process yield, and other factors.  
One of the most common types of disruption 
appearing in the literature is that of supply rate 
changes. An excellent work by Arreola-Risa & 
DeCroix (1998) explores inventory management 
of stochastic demand systems, where the product 
supply is disrupted for periods of random 
duration. The classic economic order quantity 
(EOQ) problem with supply disruptions is 
studied by Parlar & Berkin (1991) and Parlar & 
Perry (1996) consider a order-quantity/ 
reorder-point inventory models with two 
suppliers subject to independent disruptions to 
compute the exact form of the average cost 
expression. Mohebbi (2003) presents an 
analytical model for computing the stationary 
distribution of the on-hand inventory in a 
continuous-review inventory system with 
compound Poisson demand, Erlang distributed 
lead time, and lost sales, where the supplier can 
assume one of the two “available” and 
“unavailable” states at any point in time 
according to a continuous-time Markov chain. 
Papers addressing both supply disruptions and 
random demand include (Chao 1987, Parlar 
1997, Song & Zipkin 1996). Chao (1987) 
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proposes a dynamic model concerning optimal 
inventory policies in the presence of market 
disruptions, which are often characterized by 
events with uncertain arrival time, severity and 
duration. Parlar (1997) considers a continuous- 
review stochastic inventory problem with 
random demand and random lead-time where 
supply may be disrupted due to machine 
breakdowns, strikes or other randomly occurring 
events. Song & Zipkin (1996), explore an 
inventory-control model which includes a 
detailed Markovian model of the resupply 
system. A number of papers which address 
supply and demand changes have been 
developed in the field of oil stockpiling, as there 
has been grave concern over the oil supply from 
the Middle East (Teisberg 1981, Chap & Manne 
1982, Murphy et al. 1987). Modeling production 
rate disruptions (machine failures) has been 
largely addressed by extending classical 
economic manufacturing quantity (EMQ) 
models. Rosenblatt & Lee (1986) derive an 
EMQ model when the production process is 
subject to a random deterioration from an 
in-control state to an out-of control state. Lee 
(1992) models the defect-generating process in 
the semiconductor wafer probe process to 
determine an optimal lot size, which reduces the 
average processing time on a critical resource. 
Abboud (1997) presents a simple approximation 
of the EMQ model with Poisson machine 
breakdowns and low failure rate. Groenevelt et 
al. (1992) study an unreliable production system 
with constant demand and random breakdowns, 
with the focus on the effects of machine failure 
and repair on optimal lot-sizing decisions. 
Assuming exponentially distributed time 
between failures and instantaneous repair of the 
machine, authors derive some unique properties 
of their model compared to the classical EMQ 
model. Groenevelt et al. (1992) extend their 
earlier work in Groenevelt et al. (1992) to the 
case where repair times are randomly distributed 
and excess demand is lost. Kim & Hong (1997) 
propose an extension to the model in Groenevelt 
et al. (1992), which determines an optimal lot 
size when a machine is subject to random 
failures and the time to repair is constant. They 
formulate average cost functions for the optimal 
lot size, and derive conditions for determining 
the optimal lot size. Hopp et al. (1989) presents 
a model that assumes the (s, S) control policy. 
With Poisson failures and exponential repair 
times, a cost function is derived. Rahim (1994) 
presents an integrated model for determining an 
economic manufacturing quantity, inspection 
schedule and control chart design of an 
imperfect production process, where he assumes 
that the process is subject to the occurrence of a 
non-Markovian shock having an increasing 
failure rate. Among other notable examples of 
such works are Henig & Gerchak (1990), 
Bielecki & Kumar (1988), Buzacott & 
Shantikumar (1993). Finally, Abboud (2001) 
examines a single machine production and 
inventory system with a deterministic 
production and demand rate, when the machine 
is subject to random failures. The author models 
the production/inventory system as a Markov 
chain and develops an algorithm to compute the 
potentials that are used to formulate the cost 
function. 
At this point, we can summarize that 
research efforts addressing the disruption of 
supply are still comparatively new and scant. 
Most of the open literature considering various 
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types of disruptions focuses on issues of 
inventory, ordering, production lot sizing, 
production scheduling, and cost management of 
inventory, setup, and backorder costs. To the 
best of our knowledge, there have been no 
attempts to consider introducing countermeasure 
policies for mitigating unpredicted capacity 
disruptions in a capacitated system, and analyze 
the benefits of such policies for the system 
manager. Our paper presents an initial attempt to 
fill the vacuum in this area. 
The paper has the following organization. In 
Section 2, we introduce notation and problem 
definition. Section 3 presents analysis of a 
one-phase countermeasure policy, where a 
risk-neutral decision maker implements 
countermeasures during the entirety of a 
disruption cycle, striving to maximize the 
long-run average reward. These results are used 
in Section 4 to examine a richer class of policies, 
where countermeasures are activated during 
only a fraction of a disruption cycle. In Section 5, 
we present a numerical analysis for determining 
the optimal phase threshold and examine the 
sensitivity of the optimal policy to fluctuations 
in system parameter values. Finally, Section 6 
offers concluding remarks. 
2. Notation and Problem Definition 
For the rest of this paper, we define 
throughput as the long-run average of the 
number of item units per unit time processed by 
a capacitated system, and the available system 
capacity at time t, tC , is defined as the 
maximum throughput that system resources are 
capable of sustaining at t. Consider a lean (i.e., 
no inventory) system with a target (demand 
adjusted) capacity *C experiencing periodic 
random disruptions, each of which may render a 
full or partial system capacity loss. We assume 
that disruptions occur one at a time and that the 
ith occurrence results in an instantaneous loss of 
magnitude iCΔ in the remaining system 
capacity. Following the ith disruption at time t, 
the system capacity remains at level t iC C− Δ  
until the next disruption unless the remaining 
capacity falls below a critical level c upon which 
the system regains all lost capacity back to *C . 
For the reason of simplicity, in this paper, we 
assumed instantaneous recovery. The system is 
assumed to stochastically regenerate at points of 
recovery (Figure 1). Capacity dynamics as such 
can be observed in a number of industrial 
scenarios including, but are not limited to, (i) 
shortage of repair personnel and performance 
degradation caused by failing equipment with a 
full repair upon a complete failure, (ii) 
non-self-announcing stepwise system failures, 
and (iii) gradual equipment phaseout and 
modernization.  
 
Figure 1 A realization of the system capacity 
dynamics 
Let *,i iC CαΔ =  where {0 1, }i iα≤ ≤ ∈  
are assumed to form a sequence of i.i.d. random 
variables. The time of the first disruption is 
denoted by 1X , and , 2,3,iX i = … denotes the 
time between (i-1)th and ith disruptions (Figure 1). 
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We assume that , 2,3,iX i = …  are i.i.d. random 
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= Δ > −∑ . It then follows 
that cN  is the number of capacity disruptions 
between two successive recovery epochs. As 
such, 
cNY Z=  is the time between two 
successive recovery events, which marks the 
beginning and the end of a regenerative cycle. 
A proactive decision maker has a number of 
mitigation options to reduce the rate of 
disruptions. When no countermeasures are 
implemented, he earns ·t tR Cπ=  at time t , 
where π  is a time independent price factor 
minus item unit cost. Therefore, the revenue in 




tR C t Cπ π= = ⋅∫ .  
We assume that a cost of ( )m λ  per unit 
time is incurred to activate and operate a set of 
countermeasures that would maintain a rate of 
λ  capacity disruptions per unit time. In this 
paper, we are not concerned with the description 
of the nature of specific countermeasure options 
but rather we focus on the analytics of the 
disruption rate reducing impact that those 
options have on the system performance. We 
assume that the decision maker has a 
risk-neutral utility function (Keeney & Raiffa 
1993), and thus, our analysis will be based on 
the limiting long-run average reward as the 
criterion for policy assessment. 
Let ( )R m YλΠ = − ⋅  denote the total 




t zR dz m tλΠ = − ⋅∫  denote the total reward 
by time t . The long-run average reward 





Π Π→                    (1) 
In this paper, we first consider a one-phase 
mitigation policy in which countermeasures are 
activated throughout a regenerative cycle. Later, 
we will expand the analysis to examine a 
two-phase model.  
3. One-Phase Countermeasure Policy 
When countermeasures are engaged 
throughout the entire cycle, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )E E C m E Yπ λΠ = ⋅ − ⋅ , and hence, we 
seek to derive the expected cycle length and the 
expected cycle capacity. We assume that 
interarrival times iX  are distributed 
exponentially with rate λ  and that fractional 
capacity losses iα  are distributed uniformly 
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∑ ∑∑         (1) 
whereas the cycle length is 1
cN
iiY X==∑ . Before 
we proceed with computing ( )E C  and ( )E Y , 
we will need the following result to compute 
( )cE N , the expected number of capacity loss 
events per cycle. 
Result 1 Let , 1, ,i i nζ = …  be i.i.d. uniform 
[0,1] random variables. Then 
1





P u u nζ
=
≤ =∑  
Proof. We prove by induction. For 1n = , the 
result is trivial. Assuming that the result holds 
for 1n − , note that  
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Now we are in a position to compute ( )E Y  
using Result 1. Let *(1 )c Cα= −  for some 
(0,1)α ∈ . Note the equivalency of events 
{ }cN n=  and 
1
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Using Result 1 we have, 
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Computation of ( )E C  can be found in the 
Appendix. We have that 
* 2
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Using (3), we can compute the long-run 
average reward in the following way. Define 
( )C α as 
2
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Then, the limiting value of long-run average 
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In this section, we have considered a 
one-phase mitigation policy where 
countermeasures are implemented during the 
entire disruption cycle. The expression for the 
limiting long-run average reward (Eq. 4) will 
serve as a basis for analyzing a two-phase policy 
in the next section. 
4. A Two-Phase Countermeasure 
Policy 
Consider the set of policies under which 
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countermeasures are activated at the beginning 
of each system cycle and remain in effect as 
long as system capacity exceeds a certain higher 
level lc c> , where 
*(1 )l lc Cα= − ⋅  for some 
(0,1)lα ∈ . Countermeasures remain deactivated 
for levels below lc , where the system becomes 
exposed to “normal” disruption rate. This model 
is driven by the idea that from the system 
manager's viewpoint, it is desirable to stay 
longer in the “on” zone, closer to the target level 
*C  rather than prolong the “off” portion of the 
cycle. As in Section 2 and 3, c  is the critical 
lower level that triggers instantaneous capacity 
recovery (Figure 2). The system is said to be 
“on” when countermeasures are in effect and 
“off” otherwise. Long-run average reward of this 
altered process exhibits the same convergence 
property. Therefore, it is our interest in this 
section to compute [ ] / [ ]E E YΠ . 
 
Figure 2 A realization of the system capacity 
dynamics for a two-phase policy. Disruption rate 
during the “on” phase ( lλ ) is smaller than the 
disruption rate during the “off” phase ( λ ). 
We first derive the distribution of the initial 
system capacity for the “off” period in a cycle. 
The following proposition summarizes the 
result, 
Proposition 1 Consider a capacitated system in 
which capacity disruption interarrival times are 
exponentially distributed with parameter λ , 
fractional stepwise capacity losses follow a 
uniform distribution on [0,1] , and capacity is 
restored fully and instantaneously upon falling 
below level c . Suppose that the system is “on” 
when *· ,(1 )t lC Cα> −  “off” otherwise, and 
*(1 ) , lc Cα α α= − < . Then, the distribution of 
initial system capacity of the “off” period is 
given by the following,  
*
1
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Proof. We proceed by considering the number of 
capacity losses during the “on” period, 
lcN . Let 
1
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10
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Note that 
1 1( ( , ) |  )l lP α α α α α∈ > = ( ) / (1 ).l lα α α− −  
Therefore, one can verify by slight 
modifications in the computations above that (5) 
holds for 1n =  as well. Using Result 1, we 
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which concludes the proof.               ■ 
Expected cycle reward is the sum of 
expected returns of the “on” and “off” cycle 
periods. Let lY  and sY  denote the length of the 
“on” and “off” cycle periods, respectively, where 
l sY Y Y= +  is the length of the cycle. Define 
2
3 1
( ) ( ) ( , ){
l
n
l l c k l
n k
C P N n n h nα α
∞ −
= =
= = ⋅ −∑ ∑  
( , ) ( 2) (2 (2, )) (1 ).}
ll c l lh n P N hα α α− + = ⋅ − + −  
Results of the previous section can be readily 
applied to obtain the expression for expected 
total capacity, lC , during the “on” period, 
which is *( ) ( ) /l l l lE C C Cα λ= ⋅ , where lλ  is 
disruption rate during the “on” period. Similarly, 
we have ( ) / .ll lE Y e
α λ=  While the length of 
each cycle is affected by the change in 
disruption rate, the total number of disruption 
events in a cycle, cN , is determined solely by a 
uniform capacity reduction process that evolves 
independently from the disruption rate. 
Therefore, we can deduce immediately using (2) 
that ( )cE N e
α=  and ( ) .l
lcE N e
α=  Then, 
since capacity disruption rate remains at λ  








Likewise, expected total capacity during the 
“off” period, sC , can be readily obtained after 
considering the initial capacity level in the “off” 
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We also have 
*
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In order to compute ( )sE C , we need the 
expression for 0( )E C e
α α−⋅ , which is derived 
as follows, 
0( )E C e
α α−⋅  
0( ( | ))lcE E C e N
α α−= ⋅  
*
1
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1 1
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Now, we are in a position to obtain ( ) :sE C  
*
( ) ( )ls l
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λ







ψ α α α
λ
− ⋅∫  
*
( , ).l
C f α α
λ
= ⋅  
This brings us to the following principle 
proposition. 
Proposition 2 For the capacitated system 
described in Proposition 1, the long-run average 
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Proof. Using Theorem 3.6.1 in (Ross 1996), we 
know that long-run average reward converges to, 
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
.
( ) ( )
t l s l l
s l
E C E C E Y m
t E Y E Y
π λΠ ⋅ + − ⋅
→
+   (7)
 
The proof follows by substituting 
expressions for ( )lE C , ( )sE C , ( )lE Y  and 
( )sE Y  into (7).                         ■ 
5. Numerical Analysis and Sensitivity 
Study 
An optimal two-phase policy maximizes 
long-run average reward by activating 
countermeasures that set optimal levels of lλ  
and .lα In what follows, we conduct a 
parametric analysis of the optimal policy 
behavior (Eq. 6). Note that in computing 
( , )lf α α  (through ( , ))ψ α α  and ( ),l lC α  we 
encounter infinite sums which include terms 
( )
lc cP N N n− =  and ( ),lcP N n=  respectively. 
These terms represent the probability 
distribution of the number of disruptions during 
the “off” and “on” phases, respectively. Since 
the mean disruption magnitude is strictly 
positive and *C  (and hence, lc  and c ) is 
finite, both of these terms go to zero as n → ∞ . 
Since the disrupted capacity is regained 
instantaneously at the end of each cycle, the 
solution to an optimum policy * *( , )lα α  is 
trivial. Hence, we analyze the behavior of the 
optimal lα  as a function of ,α  i.e., 
*( ),lα α  
for fixed values of λ  and .lλ We first observe 
that *( )lα α  is monotonically non-decreasing in 
α : as α  increases, the cycle time will 
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increase as well, and so are the periods of lower 
system capacity. On the other hand, increasing 
lα  results in longer periods of higher system 
capacity. This trade-off between benefits and 
costs of activating countermeasures renders 
*( ) .lα α α<  In what follows, we use the initial 
parameter values as shown in Table 1. 
The cost of countermeasures is assumed to 
be of the form ( ) ( / ) .rl lm λ λ λ=  The cost 
decreases as the disruption rate lλ  gets higher, 
which is used to measure effectiveness of 
countermeasure technology, and the cost 
increases in r , which is used to model the 
marginal cost of installing a more effective 
technology. As Figure 3 illustrates, *( )lα α is 
increasingly decreasing in r . We also observe 
that as r  gets larger, *( )lα α  exhibits a higher 
sensitivity to per unit changes in r . As one can 
see, in flat regions of Figure 3, reducing the 
disruption rate is not economically sound. 
Table 1 Initial parameter values 
lλ  π  λ  
*C r  
0.0005 1,000 0.001 1 1 
 
Figure 3 A 3-dimensional representation of *lα  as a 
function of α  and .r  
For a linear cost function (r = 1, plot I in 
Figure 4), *( )lα α  is increasing in ( / ),lλ λ  
which implies that the incremental benefits of 
reducing the rate of capacity disruptions do not 
warrant the use of countermeasures over 
extended periods of time. However, if the 
marginal cost of installing better 
countermeasures is not constant ( r =0.001, plot 
II in Figure 4), the plots of *( )lα α  for different 
values of ( / )lλ λ  intersect. If the marginal cost 
of a decreased ( / )lλ λ  is relatively small, then 
*( )lα α  may be increasing with a more 
advanced technology (this relationship does not 
hold for higher values of )α . However, both 
plots agree that the rate of increase of *( )lα α  is 
higher in the lower region of ( / )lλ λ  values. 
Therefore, we see that expected increase in 
countermeasure costs over extended periods 
outweighs the benefits of better technology. 
 
Figure 4 Behavior of *( )lα α  for different values of 
/ .lλ λ  
Furthermore, we observe that *( )lα α  is 
insensitive to changes in maximum capacity *C  
in the neighborhood of initial parameter values 
in Table 1. Common wisdom, however, suggests 
that *C  shall be positively correlated with the 
optimum period of activated countermeasures. 
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Should all items be sold, increasing *C  would 
lead to higher profits and hence, 
countermeasures should be engaged for longer 
periods (plot I in Figure 5, where *C  takes 
values in [0, 0.1]). As *C  approaches 0.1, 
marginal increase in *( )lα α  falls off sharply. 
This suggests that the optimal period of 
activated countermeasures is insensitive to 
changes in maximum capacity, if *C  is already 
high. Also, the region of sensitivity of *C  is a 
function of the unit profit. As illustrated in the 
second plot of Figure 5, *( )lα α  becomes 
responsive to changes in *C ∈  [0.1, 1.0], when 
π  gets smaller (this change in sensitivity may 
be minimal if *C  is already high). 
 
Figure 5 Behavior of *( )lα α  for different values of 
α  and *.C  
A similar relation exists between *( )lα α  
and .π  Figure 6 illustrates that *C  is 
insensitive to changes in π around the original 
parameter value of π =1000 whereas at lower 
unit profit levels, marginal changes in π render 
larger perturbations in *( ).lα α Changes in 
system capacity for low value items may require 
more radical changes in countermeasure policy. 
Nevertheless, the region of sensitivity is 
relatively small for both π  and *,C which 
suggests on a larger scale that *( )lα α  is quite 
robust to changes in system profitability. 
 
Figure 6 Behavior of *( )lα α  for different values of 
α  and .π  
6. Conclusions 
In this manuscript, we presented one of 
initial attempts to fill the vacuum in the existing 
literature focused on development of active 
countermeasure policies for managing lean 
capacitated systems in the presence of random 
capacity disruptions. The system under 
consideration experienced stepwise partial 
capacity disruptions with exponentially 
distributed interarrival times and uniformly 
distributed magnitudes, followed by 
instantaneous recovery. Examples of such 
capacity dynamics include: (i) shortage of repair 
personnel and performance degradation caused 
by failing equipment with a full repair upon a 
complete failure, (ii) non-self-announcing 
stepwise system failures, and (iii) gradual 
equipment phaseout and modernization. 
We explored two different countermeasure 
policies for a risk-neutral decision maker, who 
seeks to maximize the long-run average reward. 
The initial model considered a one-phase policy, 
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where countermeasures were implemented 
during the entirety of a disruption cycle. The 
results of this model served as a basis to analyze 
a two-phase strategy, where countermeasures 
were activated during only a fraction of a 
disruption cycle. For the latter model, we aimed 
to determine the optimal threshold when the 
countermeasures should be disengaged. In this 
paper, we are primarily concerned with analytics 
of the impact that countermeasure options can 
have on the system performance. In practice, the 
countermeasure options could range from purely 
technological solutions, such as installation of 
fire prevention water sprinkler systems, to 
non-technological decisions that could, for 
example, alleviate labor strikes or prevent 
terrorist attacks or political unrest. In this 
investigation, we considered two forms of the 
countermeasure cost functions. Our sensitivity 
analysis for the two-phase policy reveals that as 
the system profitability increases and the costs 
of countermeasures become smaller, the optimal 
countermeasure policy becomes less sensitive to 
changes in the system parameter values. 
In this paper, we did not address the question 
of the best critical threshold that initiates 
immediate capacity recovery, as we assumed 
that the cost associated with administering any 
level of α is zero. Therefore, the problem of 
obtaining the optimal pair * *( , )lα α  has a trivial 
solution (i.e., set *α =0). Rather, we aimed to 
find the optimal time in each regenerative cycle 
when countermeasures should be terminated 
given a capacity recovery threshold of .α  
Section 5 presented a numerical analysis to 
determine optimal *( )lα α  that maximized 
long-run average reward under various 
parametric settings. We presented the results of 
our sensitivity analysis for an exponential cost 
function. In general, *( )lα α  was found to be 
quite sensitive to exponentially increasing cost, 
as well as capacity and unit profit changes, if the 
system was already operating with low profit 
margins. However, as the profitability of the 
system increased, *( )lα α  had a robust response 
to system parameter changes. 
In general, capacity disruption risk can be 
mitigated by reducing the probability of the 
hazardous events as well as their severity. In this 
paper, we considered countermeasures that 
mostly impact the probability of hazardous 
events rather than their severity. For risks that 
render partial capacity disruptions, the model 
recommends implementation of 
countermeasures during only a fraction of the 
operational cycle. In many cases, partial 
capacity disruptions are caused by risks 
associated with daily operations, such as small 
fire events and stoppages due to machine 
failures. For such events, our results can 
substantiate that certain countermeasures may be 
cost prohibitive even when they offer significant 
reduction in the disruption rate. For example, in 
a manufacturing facility, installation of costly 
fire extinguishing systems may be disfavored to 
employee training programs that raise awareness 
of overall factory cleanliness. 
This paper provides one of the initial 
attempts for providing closed form solutions for 
optimal countermeasure policies for mitigation 
of random disruptions in capacitated systems. 
We hope that the presented models will be 
further generalized to address similar questions 
for capacitated systems evolving under more 
complex capacity dynamics. We also believe 
that such single-facility models will form a basis 
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to approach capacity management issues in large 
enterprise networks. 
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Appendix 
Computation of ( )E C in Equation 3. We 
begin by conditioning on .cN  Noting the 
dependency between iCΔ  and ,cN we first 
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We use this conditional density to compute 
( | )k cE N nΓ = as follows: 
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Using the above expression, we eventually 
obtain 
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We can now derive expected capacity per cycle. 
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